국가정보 업무의 통제와 감독체계에 대한 비교법적 고찰을 통한 법정책적 함의 연구

This paper examines a standard model of intelligence oversight system by National Assembly through the lessons from that of U.S.A Congress experience and other countries. Intelligence oversight is the supervision of intelligence agencies, and making them accountable for their actions. Generally speaking, intelligence works was considered as a secret business. For that reason, traditionally it was far from being checked, controled and overseed by any outside player. As the warrior in time of peace, the intelligence capabilities must produce the most efficient and preventive intelligence endlessly. The Locke's concept of social contract and the idea of general will by Jean Jacqe Rousseau consist the jurisprudential ideology of national security. While the protection of legitimate government secrets is essential, the shield of secrecy should not be used to hide unlawful government activities, or to immunize government officials against accountability for the unlawful breach of human rights. Although the Constitution gives the executive branch preeminence in dealing with intelligence matters, nevertheless provides National Assembly with an important oversight role too. The President has the power to appoint and change heads of intelligence agencies and commissions, which can be used to assess intelligence topics. Under each cabinet position and intelligence agency, the Office of the Inspector General and the advisory body have oversight responsibilities and the National Security Council provides routine oversight and intelligence policy for the intelligence community. On the contrary congress’s most important source of leverage is the power to authorize programs and appropriate funds. There are two main issues in legislative oversight. One is redundancy and the other is secrecy issues. As the 9/11 Commission report stated that redundancy in congressional oversight, through the multiple responsible committees, hindered the oversight process and was not conducive to the goals of real oversight. Members of Congress have TOP SECRET security clearances by itself. Because they were elected by people to office, they do not have to submit to the background check procedures. For that reason, riskiness of leaks of classified information is the main concern. In our case, the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea passed the amending National Intelligence Service Act on 14 January 2004 for the purpose of prohibition of political intervention. And agreed full time intelligence committee. Therefor at this time, it's really important to consider and make a deep sense the tension between national security through secrecy and fair oversight by intelligence committee. For that purpose this study dealt with the national security issues and legal tools for appropriate policy measures of the National Intelligence Committee and others by the understanding those of U.S Congress system. This study's conclusion is that, despite of all hot debates about the various legality and human rights issues, the national security should be secured. For that reason, this paper suggests that one of the most important and immediate step is to understanding the legal ideology of national security and national intelligence.