성공적인 한국 기업집단의 경영체제 특성과 미래 방향 모색

This paper aims to identify the success factors in the governance systems of Korean corporategroups and suggests the future directions of the governance systems of Korean firms by analyzingthree successful Korean corporate groups: Samsung, Hyundai-Kia Motors, and POSCO. In orderto analyze their governance structures, we developed a two-by-two matrix framework to identifytheir key governance system characteristics. In one dimension, we distinguish non-Chaebol corporategroups from Chaebol type. In the other dimension, we identify vertically-integrated corporate groupswith a single core business from diversified corporate groups with multiple core businesses. Samsunggroup is a Chaebol type corporate group with multiple core businesses, while Hyundai-Kia Motorsgroup is a Chaebol type corporate group with a single core business. POSCO group is a non-Chaebolcorporate group with a single core business. Then, we describe the governance systems of each corporate group in detail. We collected datamainly by interviewing multiple executives of those groups. Samsung group is the largest andmost successful Korean corporate group so far. It has grown very fast and has become a world-classcorporate group under the leadership of group Chairman Kun-Hee Lee. Key characteristics ofSamsung’s governance system can be summarized as follows. First, the role of Chairman Leehas been critical in Samsung’s success in the global market. He had a very strong will to transformSamsung into a world-class corporate group, provided an audacious vision to organizational membersof the Samsung group, and suggested basic direction to transform the group by using his businessinsight. He directed the group with a long-term vision and deep understanding of the critical successfactors of Samsung’s major businesses. Chairman Lee’s vision has been implemented by a verypowerful group headquarters and by professional managers. The group headquarters coordinatesand integrates decisions of affiliate companies to pursue group level optimization. The headquartersexerts a strong influence on nominating directors and executives of affiliate companies, and isinvolved in major investment decisions of the affiliates. Executives of affiliate companies arenominated on the basis of their own performance as well as of the performance of the organizationalunit they work for. Monetary compensation of organizational members is very tightly linked withbusiness performance and thus the incentives of stockholders, executives, and the rank-and-fileare tightly aligned. This tight incentive alignment helps Samsung concentrate efforts of its employees to achieve the vision of Chairman Lee. The Hyundai-Kia Motors group has emerged as a major player in world automobile industryunder the leadership of Chairman Mong-Ku Chung. Similar to Samsung’s Chairman Lee, ChairmanChung had a very strong will to build up a world-class automobile corporate group, provided anaudacious vision, and dictated the quality improvement as the most important success factor inthe automobile industry. While Chairman Lee delegates most of his decisions to professional managersin Samsung, Chairman Chung remains involved in major decisions of his affiliate companies. ChairmanChung has practiced “management by wandering around.” He has frequently visited major placesof his concern and checks whether his vision is being properly implemented. Group headquartersdoes not play a major role in group-level governance in this group but provide decision support servicesto Chairman Chung and the CEOs of affiliate companies. While a very large portion of executivesin affiliate companies of Samsung group are trained in managerial functions such as finance,accounting, human resources management, and auditing, the majority of executives in the Hyundai-KiaMotors group are trained in assembly, quality control, sales and marketing, and R&D. Integrationacross affiliate companies is accomplished mainly by the decisions of Chairman Chung and theCEOs of the affiliate companies instead of group headquarters. Informal networks among executivesthat cut across diverse affiliate companies also facilitate integration. One peculiar characteristicin the governance systems of the group is the existence of a strong and hostile labor union. POSCO group became a major steel producing corporate group under the leadership of its firstleader Chairman Tae-Jun Park. As a professional executive, he directed the company for more than25 years with a strong will to build a world-class steel producing company. After Chairman Parkstepped down from his position in 1992, the speed of the company's growth slowed dramatically. This stagnation was partly due to drawbacks in POSCO’s governance systems. Lack of a stronggroup headquarters as well as the formal processes needed for integration of decisions with affiliatecompanies has weakened performance. The most critical flaw in POSCO’s governance systemis the strong influence of external actors in nominating the group chairman. Seven different chairmenhave been appointed in the past 22 years. In the process of nominating chairman, it has been suspectedthat government officials and the ruling political party have exerted a strong influence, damaginggovernance credibility. This influence from political parties and frequent changes in corporategovernance could be a bad omen for the POSCO group. Top management level executives includingthe chairman of the group are very likely to have difficulty in pursuing long-term vision and initiatingmajor corporate changes. Based on the analysis, we provided suggestions for governance systems of Korean corporategroups. First of all, group chairman candidates having a strong will to build a world-class corporategroup and a strong competence to unite all organizational members to accomplish audacious visionshould be developed and appointed as a chairman. Second, the chairman should be provided witha very long tenure and a strong monetary incentive based on long-term performance such thathe/she voluntarily pursues a long-term vision. Here, the political influence of ruling parties thatproduce frequent changes in group chairman should be avoided. Third, corporate groups shoulddevelop governance and management systems that can make business units and employees behaveto accomplish the long-term vision provided by the chairman.