정부 간 재정이전과 지방세 수입 간의 경쟁적 관계에 대한 연구

This paper focuses on the competitive relationship between transfer from central government and own sources of local government, which becomes a main issue as moral hazard problem of local government, in other words, it estimates on the possibility that transfer revenues becomes a incentive, which is able to interfere with an effort to collect tax from local government. The conclusion of this paper as follows;First, the decreasing tendency of own sources against increasing transfer revenues from central government is strong in counties, which have a relative weak fiscal capacity, and such the tendency is stronger in tax revenues than in nontax revenues. Secondly, the result from estimating on the relationship between transfer and own sources by dynamic model shows that although own sources specifically tax revenue increases in cities, specifically unconditional grant like local share tax dose not make increasing utility of investment by cities weak, while it make the utility weak from decreasing tax revenues in counties. Thirdly, under the structural changes such as increasing share tax rate, business recession, and economic crisis, transfer decreases own sources specifically in counties, especially it is founded even in cities from the cases of increasing share tax rate and economic crisis.