페이오프 해금 이후 일본 금융안전망의 변화 –일본진흥은행의 사례를 통해 본 파산처리방식의 실태–

Under the convoy system, management bankrupted financial institutions were “relieved”, under the guidance of the government, through sponsorship of relevant financial institutions or relief merger. However, with the decrease of rent in sass, it became impossible to preserve the existing financial safety net based on “relief”. Also, in the midst of spread of financial unrest in sass, the financial authority suspended the application of the payoff arrangement. In this paper, we attempted an empirical analysis on the evolution of Japanese financial safety net from government -led convoy system to Anglo-American model where market competition is emphasized. Looking into the resolution of financial institution of Incubator Bank of Japan, they liquidated troubled banks in line with the relevant rules such as deposit insurance system, used Deposit Insurance Funds - a kind of public money - to cover its necessary costs for handling bankruptcy and incurred loss of depositors. Focusing on these elements may suggest that the Japanese financial safety net is approaching that of Anglo-American financial system. However, it is early to conclude that the Japanese financial safety net has been transformed to that of Anglo-American system. We believe that the processing bankruptcy based on the payoff system would not be generalized in the future, rather the newly forming financial system will take a hybrid model in which particularities of both the Japanese model and Anglo-American models co-exist.