사외이사 특성으로 인한 경영자 이익조정이 기업의 경영성과에 미치는 영향

This study explores the attentive issue of outside director policy by empirically analyzing the effect of specific outside director characteristics on earnings management within firms. The following is a simplified discussion obtained from the findings of this study. First, the characteristics of outside directors include salary, adoption of an auditing board and ratio of outside directors. The results of this study find that salary and adoption of an auditing board significantly influence earnings management through real activities manipulation. Specifically, the higher the outside director's salary, the more the firm's executives use downward manipulation, and executives are less likely to apply upward manipulation in firms with an audit board. Second, the effect of characteristics of outside directors on the relation between real activities through earnings management manipulation and future firm performance is found in this study. Regarding this finding, the greater the outside director's salary and the greater the tendency toward downward manipulation, the smaller the degree of future orientation in firms.