회계감리제도가 기업의 이익조정행위 수단에 미치는 영향 - 재량적 발생액과 실제이익조정활동을 중심으로 -

Prior studies focusing on behavioral of fraud firms after FSS's enforcement actions released is very little. Because one of these actions is to induce fraud firms to mend their way, this study examines whether fraud related FSS enforcement actions encourage firms identified by the FSS as fraudulently manipulating their financial statements to report relevantly and reliably their financial statements. This study's evaluation of FSS's enforcement actions is as follows; If AM of fraud firms decrease and RM increase after the FSS's enforcement actions released, although it is consistent with Zang(2006) and Cohen et al.(2008), it can be called as "inefficient function of FSS's enforcement actions" because managers continuously manage earnings using RM as replacement of AM. However AM and RM ,both of them, decrease subsequent this event, it can be interpreted as "efficient function of FSS's enforcement actions" because these firms moderate earnings management after the actions. The empirical results summarized as follows; First, AM decreases after the FSS's enforcement actions released. This results can be analysed as CEO‘ incentive to manage earnings is weaken because auditor's attitude became more conservative and FSS's monitoring and punishment strengthen. Second, RM also decreases subsequent that actions released. Therefore, this result does not support Cohen et al.(2008) etc., and it provide evidence that the FSS's enforcement actions are efficiently functioned. That is, decrease of AM and RM after that, the FSS's enforcement actions weaken manager's incentives to manipulate earnings. In additional test, We can reassure that interaction effect of AM and RM statistically significant lowers subsequent FSS's enforcement actions released. Therefore, managers make efforts to report their financial statements relevantly and reliably due to current FSS's enforcement actions.