수시공시품질의 결정요인에 대한 연구

We investigate what factors influence the quality of timely disclosure focusing on both agency problems and monitoring incentives for managers. Considering three agency problems which can occur between stockholders and managers, between stockholders and creditors, and between majority and minority stockholders, we examine whether each category of agency problems is associated with the quality of timely disclosure. We also examine whether the incentives of outside monitors such as independent directors, audit committee and foreign investors are associated with the quality of timely disclosure. We classify timely disclosure into timely mandatory disclosure and timely voluntary disclosure. We use the designation of unfaithful disclosure as a proxy for the quality of timely mandatory disclosure and the number of timely voluntary disclosure as a proxy for the quality of timely voluntary disclosure. We use 534 non-financing firm-year data concerning Korean listed companies for the period 2002-2012. We selected 267 non-financing firms designated as unfaithful disclosure firms, matched with those not selected as unfaithful disclosure firms. The matching criteria used in this paper include year, industry and firm size. Our main findings of this study are as follows. First, we find that managerial ownership, the existence of stock options for managers, and foreign investors' stockholding ratio are negatively associated with possibility of being designated as unfaithful disclosure firm. We also find that debt ratio is positively associated with possibility of being designated as unfaithful disclosure firm. Second, we find that the number of timely voluntary disclosure is positively associated with the dummy variable indicating whether managers belong to the business group, the proportion of the independent directors on the board of directors and the stockholding ratio of foreign investors. Third, regarding the group as high quality of timely disclosure which is high number of timely voluntary disclosure and not designated as unfaithful disclosure firm, we find that the existence of stock options for managers and foreign investors' stockholding ratio are positively associated with the quality of timely disclosure. However, we find that debt ratio is negatively associated with the quality of timely disclosure.