특수관계자 거래와 보수적 회계처리간의 관련성 연구

This study examines the relationship between related party transactions(RPT) and conservatism. RPT is subject to regulation because it is easy to adjust transaction condition in the transactions to the related party. Related parties can profit from transactions at the firm’s or stakeholder’s expense. If there are not special relationship, RPT might not happen or be processed on different conditions. In addition RPT can enable the firm to manipulate its financial statements. In this reason, outside stakeholders are concerned about RPT and want to monitor it. According to the previous studies, the firms with high RPT lead to increase earning management and agency cost because of the high information asymmetry. RPT also effects a negative impact on firm value. As a result of this, stakeholders may anticipate the potential agency cost with respect to RPT. In this case, accounting conservatism plays an important role in mitigating agency cost and earning management because conservatism reduces manager’s ability and incentive to overstate net assets and earnings. Therefore we anticipate that stakeholders will demand for monitoring mechanism, that is accounting conservatism, to control manager’s opportunistic behavior. Managers will also increase a accounting conservatism because they want to maintain a good relationship with stakeholders and to send a signal that the agency cost is effectively monitored by the firm. This study uses 9,243 firm-year observations collected from 2001 to 2009 period. The observations are composed of the non-financial companies which are listed in the Korea Exchange and whose fiscal year-end is December 31. All RPT and financial data are obtained via TS2000. To reduce the influence of extreme observations, we winsorized all variable at 1% and 99%. In the analyses, we use Ball and Shivakumar(2006) model to measure the degree of the conservatism. As the empirical results, we find strong evidence that is the positive association between RPT and accounting conservatism. This result indicates that the firms with high RPT report more conservative accounting information to reflect stakeholder’s demands for monitoring mechanism. We also conduct the several robustness check on the analysis and we find that our results are robust to these additional analyses. Overall, we suggest that stakeholders play a important role in monitoring RPT. And our results reconfirm accounting conservatism as a monitoring mechanism to reduce the information asymmetry and the agency cost. Finally, this study examines the direct association between RPT and accounting conservatism.