벤처캐피탈리스트 유형과 이익조정이 신용평가에 미치는 영향

The aims of this study are to verify how a credit rating agency reflects a venture capitalist type, being a major shareholder, in the process of credit rating and whether its evaluation for earnings management changes depending on the presence of the venture capitalist in ownership structure. The results of this study are as follows. First, it is seemed that the credit rating agency regards the increase of major shareholder's ownership of the venture firm as a positive determinant of credit rating. This result may be interpreted that it supports the convergence of interest hypothesis. On the other hand, when the major shareholder of the venture firm is the venture capitalist, rather than a individual, it may have received relatively better credit rating. Especially, it should have been evaluated more positively when financial institutions, which have the excellent information analysis power is the major shareholder. Meanwhile, it shows that earnings management is negatively associated with the credit rating. In particular, the credit rating agencies are likely to assess earnings management more negatively when the first shareholders are financial institutions or the second shareholders are corporate venture capitalist. Although the above useful results present, this study has the limitation that it cannot be convinced the venture capitalist is always a good monitor to firm's management due to their conspiracy possibility for pursuing their private interests at the expense of outside shareholders. However, this study could not suggest the substantial evidence of this possibility. In the Future, this study hopes that many researchers find the more role of the venture capitalist in venture firms with their enhanced methodology.