무역보험 약관의 역선택에 관한 연구

This paper is a study on the adverse selection in trade insurance clauses. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the clauses of adverse selection, and then to work out the solution about asymmetric information from adverse selection in trade insurance clauses. For this purpose, especially this paper explains theoretically the adverse selection. Also this paper analyse term of insurance, commencement date, duty of disclosure, subrogation, package policy, experienced premium rate in trade insurance clauses. The problems created by adverse selection are an important impediment to well functioning trade insurance, so insurance market failure occurs because of those problems. In conclusion, for the economically corresponding schems of the problems from adverse selection, authority and insurer should plan and manage some solutions such as norm or system to mitigate the problems of adverse selection, collateral, monitoring and enforcement of restrictive covenants etc. To maintain a long term growth in trade insurance market, the insurer needs to make continuous efforts discouraging adverse selection by the means of minimizing information asymmetry and reviewing the insurance incentive.