국가기관의 압수ㆍ수색ㆍ검증 거부권

Recently, the executions of a seizure, search and inspection warrant for the NationalIntelligence Service's main server database and the Korean presidential residence's security servicefoundered as a result of government agency's veto based on the Criminal Procedure Act Article110 and 111. This thesis reviews the theories, cases and legislative directions regarding the legal conditionsand issues of the Criminal Procedure Act Article 110 and 111. First, the case of the President Lee Myung-bak's private residence site relates to the CriminalProcedure Act Article 110. But, the veto by the Korean presidential residence's security service was illegal because the object of seizure warrant was not a military secret, the all area of search warrant was not for amilitary secret and the executions of warrant did not harm the national important interest. Second, the case of the National Intelligence Service's illegal electioneering for the eighteenthpresidential election relates to the Criminal Procedure Act Article 111. But, the veto by the National Intelligence Service's director was illegal because the object ofseizure warrant was not a official secrets, the veto for search and inspection based on the CriminalProcedure Act Article 111 was impossible and the executions of warrant did not harm the nationalimportant interest. The two cases were not just a one off. If the government agency can use the veto for seizure,search and inspection easily, the abuse case of the government agency's veto will increase and therule of law will be at risk. To conclude, for the realization of the rule of law, investigative authority must have the strongwill based on the political neutrality and independence. Furthermore, the judiciary must apply andinterpret the law strictly.