Google의 “검색 편향” 관련 FTC의 조사에 관한 법경제학적 분석

In 2007, Google changed its search algorithm and how the search results were displayed. Instead of showing “10 blue links” to websites, Google placed its own services in shopping, local information (e.g., restaurant reviews), hotel/airline reservations in prominent parts of the search results page. Critics argued that Google intentionally “demoted” competing services, prompting multi-year formal investigations by FTC and EC into Google’s conduct. In January 2013, FTC decided not to take any action with regard to these “search bias” allegations. In contrast, EC has continued its own investigations. This paper conducts an economic analysis of the logic behind FTC’s decision. In particular, I show that the arguments advanced by Bork and Sidak (2012) and Salinger and Levinson (2013, 2014) that Google’s “playing favorites” of its own services cannot produce anticompetitive results do not withstand close scrutiny. Instead, I argue that the application of the Post Chicago School, in particular the strategic leverage theory pioneered by Whinston (1990) and dynamically extended by Carlton and Waldman (2002), reveals that, at a theoretical level, Google has both economic incentives and the ability to restrict competition in the “market for traffic acquisition into specialized search services”. FTC closed its investigations into “search bias” allegations without taking an action not because it believed that Google’s prominent display of its own services is not capable of producing anticompetitive results, but because Google’s algorithm change resulted in significant consumer benefits and because FTC was concerned that competition authorities and courts are ill-equipped to make judgments about search engine designs.