내부통제 취약점 공시에 대한 중국 자본시장의 반응

In America, a disclosure of internal control system was obliged according to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act(SOX) legislated in 2002. Regarding informativeness of internal control system, studies about how capital market responds to the disclosure that the internal control system is weak have been made. Generally the evidence that capital market responds negatively to the disclosure of internal control weakness indicates that the disclosure of internal control system has a important informativeness. With the growing illegal acts and misconducts by management, China's regulatory agency required listed companies to establish an effective internal control system in 2010. The purpose of this study is to investigate the market response to the disclosure of internal control weakness in Shenzhen market which provides enough number of sample firms. The abnormal stock return using market model was used to measure the market response to the disclosure. Empirical results are as follows. The firms that announced the weakness of internal controls showed lower abnormal returns than those of companies which did not. The regression analysis including control variable to abnormal returns also showed that capital market responded negatively to the firms that announced the weaknesses of internal control. Because of short history of internal control regulation in China, this study employed relatively small number of firms which announced the weaknesses of internal control. In spite of this limit, this study suggested that capital market in China indicates meaningful responses to the weakness of internal control.