감사보수, 감사시간 및 감사품질에 감사파트너 고정효과가 존재하는가?

everal recent studies in economics and finance have examined and reported significant individual fixed effects in numerous corporate decisions as well as corporate performance. In this study, we extend the previous literature by investigating individual fixed effects in the auditing framework. More specifically, this study explores (1) the individual audit partner fixed effect on audit fees, audit hours, and audit quality using the full sample, the sample consisted of Big 4 audit firms, and the sample consisted of each individual Big 4 audit firm; (2) whether there exists the systematic correlations among the partner fixed effect in audit fees, audit hours, and audit quality. Using a sample consisted of listed companies during the period of 2006 to 2011, we find the following results. First, there exist significant individual partner fixed effects in audit fees. More specifically, individual partner effects are collectively significant in the conventional audit fee model after controlling for the factors that are known to be related to audit fees and the audit firm fixed effect. Moreover, the inclusion of individual partner dummies in the model significantly improves the explanatory power of the audit fee model. The significant individual partner effect is also present when the analyses are restricted to the partners who work for Big 4 audit firms. Further, individual partner fixed effects are observed within each Big 4 audit firm. The results are qualitatively similar when the dependent variable is audit hours. That is, similar to the results using audit fees as the dependent variable, significant individual partner fixed effects are present in audit hours. We also find that there exist significant individual partner fixed effects in audit quality. However, when the dependent variable is audit quality, we find no evidence of partner fixed effects among partners who work for Big 4 audit firms. The results using individual Big 4 audit firm are mixed. More specifically, while the coefficients on individual partner dummy variables are insignificant, nevertheless, the explanatory power of the audit quality model improves significantly when individual partner dummy variables are included in the model. We find that partner fixed effects in audit fees and audit hours are positively correlated whereas they are negatively correlated with partner fixed effects in audit quality. Since audit quality is defined as the absolute value of the performance matched discretionary accruals, the negative correlations indicate that partners who tend to charge more are likely to spend more audit hours and perhaps as a consequence they are likely to show higher audit quality in their audits.