K-IFRS를 자발적으로 도입한 기업의 지배구조 특성

Focusing on both contracts among stakeholders and monitoring incentive by outside monitors, this study analyzes the corporate governance characteristics of firms voluntarily adopting K-IFRS. We use majority shareholder ratio, CEO stock-options, debt ratio and the existence of affiliated companies as the proxies for contracts among stakeholders and define the ratio of outside directors on the board of directors, foreign investors holding and Big 4 audit firms as proxies for outside monitoring. And then we investigate the effect of stakeholder contracts and outside monitoring on the voluntary adoption of K-IFRS. The samples for this study consist of non-financing companies voluntarily adopting K-IFRS for the period from 2009 to 2010 and are matched with those not adopting K-IFRS for that period. The matching criteria used in the paper include year, type of capital market, industry classification, firm size and the external auditor type. Our final sample consists of 57 non-financing firm-year data with voluntary adopting K-IFRS and 57 control firm-year data without adopting it. Our empirical findings are as follows: We find that among stakeholder contracts variables, majority shareholders, CEO stock option holdings and debt ratio are significantly associated with the voluntary adopting K-IFRS. We also find that voluntary adopting K-IFRS is associated with the stockholding ratio of foreign investors and the existence of Big 4 audit firm.