소유구조와 실물활동 이익조정수준에 따른 자사주 매입의 장기시장반응 : 유가증권 상장기업을 중심으로

Current practice of open market stock repurchases (OMSRs henceforth) does not impose binding commitments on management because OMSRs programs simply authorize firms to execute stock repurchases. Depending on the market conditions, managers can modify the volume of shares to be repurchased without any restrictions. Thus, OMSRs leave room for false signaling and/or opportunistic announcements to boost stock prices to pursue private benefits. Our study uses information available to investors (ex ante) before the announcements of OMSRs: the degree of earnings management through real activities which is under the control of the management. We find that the larger the upward adjustments of earnings through real earnings management(REM) in the year prior to repurchases announcement the lower long-run abnormal returns for 12 months or 24 months after the repurchase announcement date. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the market discounts positive information contents of repurchase announcements when the announcing firms’ earnings were recently adjusted upward by real activities. We also find that corporate governance affects the level of real earnings management prior to stock repurchases announcement, which leads to fluctuation in the reliability of stock repurchases and has a significant effect on long-term market reactions after stock repurchases announcement date.