벤처기업의 1대 주주 지분율과 감사보고시차가 감사보수에 미치는 영향

Venture firms may be one of types of the typical businesses which are established on the basis of a founder’s technical skills and not clearly separated ownership and management. A number of researchers at home and abroad have attempted to verify the relation between the largest shareholder’s share ratio and a firm value but not shed light on the role of auditors in corporate governance. This study aims to investigate the role of auditors in venture firm corporate governance by examining the effect of the largest shareholder’s share ratio of venture firms and audit report lag on audit fees. The results from this study will provide novel empirical evidence for auditors and potential investors and then allow them to make a better decision. This study covers the 2007－2012 time periods and investigates the final sample of 1,320 observations in which meet conditions required for this study. This study implies that the largest shareholder’s influence to management lead to audit efficiency because share ratio of the largest shareholders with high audit efficiency is not related to earnings management when audit efficiency while managers and auditors reach consensus on audit opinion without the auditor’s independence impairment. Therefore, it seems that auditors evaluate that the venture firm’s largest shareholder with high share ratio is more likely to lower audit risk because the interests of the largest and the outside shareholders increasingly coincide and firms with shorter audit report lags also lead to lower audit risk because they settle their differences soon. Meanwhile, it is thought that auditors independently reflect these two factors in audit fees pricing.