방위산업체의 지속가능경영과 원가의 하방경직성

Government have taken steps to mitigate the agency problems when contracting with defense firms to procure weapon systems. but Government have focused on improving the contract systems and there was a little effectiveness to prevent the agency problems in the defense industry. In this study we examine whether the procurement qualification systems which evaluate the social responsibility of the bidder are playing an important roles to mitigate the agency problems and then we will suggest direct and empirical evidences as control mechanisms to reduce the agency problems in the defense market. According to the empirical results, we find informative empirical evidences that the cost stickiness asymmetry of the defense firms is positively associated with the social responsibility evaluation scores of the Qualification Systems and we can suppose that defense firms have selected an undesirable cost strategies in response to the decreasing sales period which means that firms should reduce direct labor costs in response to the decrease sales period, however they haven’t. In other words, there is a little effectiveness to prevent the agency problems when using the Qualification Systems in the procurement contract. Finally, the implication of our study is that if the government evaluates the qualified bidders to find reliable contractors, we suggest that the government have to reconsider the current Qualification Systems to assess the social responsibility of the defense firms participating in the tender.