탈공산 유럽 국가를 통해 본 통일헌법: 협의적 민주주의의 필요성을 중심으로

The transitional experiences of Post-communist European countries tell us that the decentralization of power and the practices of consensus democracy are critical for social and political integration and market reform. The statistical analyses and case studies firmly confirm this lesson. The constitutional order based upon simple majoritarian rules would make the unified Korea vulnerable with separatist movements because socioeconomic cleavages are likely to be identical with the geographic demarcation between North and South. To encourage the integration of the unified Korea and sound developments in the northern part we need to definitely adopt constitutional measures for consensus democracy. Two institutions are worth considering: upper chamber in the legislative and constitution-preserving judiciary. These two institutions are typical anti-majoritarian measures to encourage compromise and enhance cooperative practices among political actors. These two institutions could provide the North Korean people with a credible commitment to the future and prevent confrontational politics by elites who try to exploit geographical cleavages.