상장폐지 기업의 이익조정 형태와 상장폐지 실질심사 제도가 이익조정에 미치는 영향

This paper studies the patterns of earings management of the delisted companies and the effect of Substantial Investigation System of Delisting (hereafter “SISOD”) on earnings management. We use 293 firms (879 firm－year) which were delisted from 2003 to 2012 and we use Discretionary Accruals (hereafter “DA”) and Real Earnings Management (hereafter “REM”) as proxies for earnings management. From the result of the patterns of earings management of the delisted companies, we find that DA significantly declines as the periods of delisting come closer. However, we find that there is no significant difference of REM, and the high level of REM continues along with the periods of delisting. The results suggest that the delisted companies choose REM rather than DA because REM is expected to have the lower risk to be detected and is a tool to manage earnings more easily than DA. We also find DA and REM of the delisted companies decrease after implementation of SISOD compared to those before implementation of SISOD. The results suggest that it is getting difficult for managers to manage earnings with opportunistic accounting methods because the auditors are expected to perform the audit procedures more strictly after implementation of SISOD. And the companies are likely to be detected through SISOD and to be delisted if they manipulate total sales or production to increase earnings and avoid the formal causes of delisting.