특허통합의 제도적 조건: 유럽특허조약의 확대, 1977-2010

In the era of knowledge economy, Intellectual Property Rights is the rule of the game thatinfluence on the direction of international competition in the future. However, Agreementon Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights(TRIPs) is one of the slowestWTO Agreement in progress. In this respect, European Patent Convention(EPC) whichaccomplished Patent Integration at the regional economy levels is worthy of note. In thisresearch, we regard Patent Integration not only as the problem of economic efficiency, but alsoas the problem of both political stabilization and social legitimation. In specific, TransactionCost Economics, Institutionalist Political Economy, and Sociological Institutionalism share thename of ‘Institutionalism’ on the one hand, these approaches provide unique explanations of‘what Patent Institution is for’ on the other. Based on this theoretical background, our researchprovide a series of hypotheses to examine the institutional motives of Patent Integration :(1) three economic efficiency hypotheses which are based on Transaction Cost Economics,(2) three political stabilization hypotheses which are based on Institutionalist PoliticalEconomy, and (3): three social legitimization hypotheses which are based on SociologicalInstitutionalism. We collected data from 33 nation-states who joined European PatentConvention(EPC) between 1977 and 2010, and tested our hypotheses using event-historyanalysis. Our Results indicate that economic efficiency hypotheses and social legitimizationhypotheses are fully accepted but political stabilization hypotheses are fully rejected.