추징세액의 발생이 지배구조 개선에 미치는 영향

Corporate governance functioning as a company supervisory unit affects managers’ tax evasion acts. Many preceding studies in the tax accounting field assert that corporate governance is a factor influencing tax evasion acts. While many preceding tax accounting studies argue the corporate governance affects tax evasion in the ex ante manner, only few studies have researched if there is any effort to improve corporate governance in the case of ex-post tax amount by the result of tax audits. Unlike the previous studies, the present study aims at conducting an ex-post verification of the relationship between tax amount by the result of tax audits and corporate governance. In this study, enterprises charged with additional corporate tax and other taxes were investigated to see if their corporate governance is practically improved as the additional tax amount grows larger to further ease the subsequent agency problem after additional tax imposition. Here, the study verified if corporate governance is continuously enhanced after 1 year and 2 years from the additional tax collection. As a result of this empirical study, it was found that the corporate governance total scores continued to move up after 1 year and 2 years from the business year of additional tax collection. This finding indicates that, after additional tax collection, the monitoring function of supervisory organizations and market help alleviate the agency problem. In other words, this study found the easing of agency problem in terms of the increased corporate governance total scores. To sum, it was found herein that for companies with the agency problem or serious opacity in corporate governance, the punitive measure of additional tax collection could lead to their agency problem alleviation or corporate governance enhancement.