청소년 뇌과학 연구가 미국의 소년사법에 미친 영향에 관한 고찰

Recent scientific findings about the developing teen brain have both captured public attention and begun to percolate through legal theory and practice. Indeed, many believe that developmental neuroscience contributed to the U.S. Supreme Court’s elimination of the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. Simmons. Developmental neuroscience nonetheless can play a small role in juvenile justice going forward. Legislatures and courts may regard that science as one source among many upon which to draw when basing policy choices on assumptions about juveniles as a group. Post-Roper, scholars assert that the developmentally normal attributes of the teen brain counsel differential treatment of young offenders, and advocates increasingly make such arguments before the courts. Recent U.S. Supreme Court rulings have also helped shift public opinion—and the court itself seems to be impressed with brain research. A state cannot impose a life-without-parole sentence for juvenile homicide offenders on a mandatory basis. That decision followed a 2010 ruling in Graham v. Florida that juvenile offenders could not be sentenced to mandatory life-without-parole for non-homicide offenses. Limitations intrinsic to the science itself — for example, individual variation — also hinder its relevance and impact. These factors both explain why developmental neuroscience has had minimal effects on juvenile justice in the courts and illustrate why it generally should. Neuroscience can, however, play a limited role in juvenile justice policy. It reinforces the (once) noncontroversial idea that, as a group, young people differ from adults in systematic ways directly relevant to their relative culpability, and potential for rehabilitation. Therefore, legal decision-makers exercising a policy-making role — usually legislatures but sometimes the courts — ought to consider developmental neuroscience one source among many upon which to draw when making legally relevant assumptions about adolescents as a group.