충실의무자의 이익향유금지 : 수탁자와 이사의 이익향유금지를 중심으로

The Revised Korean Trust Act fully received Anglo-American concept of fiduciary law. In particular, it declares two fiduciary principles, the no-conflict rule and the no-profit rule. The former requires the fiduciary to avoid conflict between personal interest and duty whrease the latter requires him to avoid making an unauthorized profit from his or her position as a fiduciary. The no-profit rule prohibits fiduciaries from obtaining a benefit by virtue of their position as fiduciary either for themselves or for a third party, unless the principal has given his or her fully informed consent to the fiduciary. This article investigates to what extent the Korean trust and corporate laws adopted such fiduciary concept and how the no-profit rule operate under the respective Korean Trust Act and the Korean Commercial Code. It argues that the default fiduciary law that is developed on the basis of Korean Trust Act should be applied to other kinds of fiduciary such as a director or a agent. This article firstly explains the contents of Korean no-profit rule that can be drawn from the Korean Trust Act and then explores whether and to what extent the trust no-profit rule can be applied to a company director. It argues that although corporate no-profit provisions apply firstly to directors' profiting, the trust no-profit rule can also apply to the directors' profit-making in order to fill the gap that are left by insufficient provisions in the Code.