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학술논문안암법학2015.09 발행KCI 피인용 4

호주의 이사 보수 규제에 관한 연구- 우리법의 문제점과의 비교를 중심으로 -

A Comparative Analysis of Director/CEO Remuneration Regulation in Australia and Republic of Korea

김희철(원광대학교)

48호, 259~280쪽

초록

The regulation of director or CEO remuneration is one of the most controversial topics addressed in corporate governance area today. Coping with a series of excessive remuneration scandal, Australia has had a say-on-pay requirement in place since 2005, starting with a mandatory nonbinding shareholder vote on the remuneration report. Since July 1, 2011, however, the nonbinding vote on the remuneration report was replaced by a binding vote, the so-called two-strikes regime. Under this regime, if 25% or more of shareholders vote against a company’s remuneration report at two consecutive annual general meetings (AGMs), the board is subject to a so-called “spill” motion. If the spill motion receives the support of 50% or more of the company’s shareholders, then a separate general meeting must be called within 90 days at which all directors except for executive directors must stand for re-election. Introducing the two strikes say on pay as well as other regulations such as directors’ report, remuneration committee, and corporate governance principles and recommendations which adopt “if not, why not” approach(same as the U.K. comply or explain), the author applies the Australian legal structures to the Korea regulatory issues on directors’ remuneration. The author also insists the necessity for the revision of Korean directors’ remuneration regulations.

Abstract

The regulation of director or CEO remuneration is one of the most controversial topics addressed in corporate governance area today. Coping with a series of excessive remuneration scandal, Australia has had a say-on-pay requirement in place since 2005, starting with a mandatory nonbinding shareholder vote on the remuneration report. Since July 1, 2011, however, the nonbinding vote on the remuneration report was replaced by a binding vote, the so-called two-strikes regime. Under this regime, if 25% or more of shareholders vote against a company’s remuneration report at two consecutive annual general meetings (AGMs), the board is subject to a so-called “spill” motion. If the spill motion receives the support of 50% or more of the company’s shareholders, then a separate general meeting must be called within 90 days at which all directors except for executive directors must stand for re-election. Introducing the two strikes say on pay as well as other regulations such as directors’ report, remuneration committee, and corporate governance principles and recommendations which adopt “if not, why not” approach(same as the U.K. comply or explain), the author applies the Australian legal structures to the Korea regulatory issues on directors’ remuneration. The author also insists the necessity for the revision of Korean directors’ remuneration regulations.

발행기관:
안암법학회
DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.22822/alr..48.201509.259
분류:
법학일반

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호주의 이사 보수 규제에 관한 연구- 우리법의 문제점과의 비교를 중심으로 - | 안암법학 2015 | AskLaw | 애스크로 AI