기업과 외부정보이용자 간 비대칭적 정보가보수적 회계처리에 미치는 영향

There are differences in the information environment should exist between corporate managers and external shareholders. Managers with more information act the opportunistic behavior and to pay more money for minority representatives will monitor the management in order to reduce the difference between the information environment. Watts and Zimmerman(1986) argue that accounting conservatism have been responsible for controlling the management of opportunistic earnings. Watts(2003) argue that reducing agency costs was due to the role of conservatism that checks and monitors the executive. The purpose of this study was to analyze how to strengthen the information asymmetry between managers and outside shareholders accounting conservatism. This paper used the difference(BTD) of the measurements to observable accounting profit and taxable income of the information asymmetry and conservatism of the individual company level measured using the method of Khan and Watts(2009). This paper empirically test this prediction using 5,485 firm－year. First, we find that differences between accounting income and taxable income(BTD) has a significant negative influence to conservatism(CSCORE). Second, we find that the absolute value of the difference between accounting income and taxable income(ABTD) has a significant positive influence to conservatism(CSCORE). Third, we find that in robust analysis difference between accounting income and taxable income(BTD) in firm of positive BTD has a significant positive influence to conservatism(C－SCORE) and in firm of negative BTD has significant negative influence to conservatism(C－SCORE). Overall, increase of the information asymmetry between managers and outside shareholders appear to be strengthening conservatism supported the research hypothesis.