公司治理对高管薪酬与企业绩效关联度的影响研究 ——以中国上市公司为对象

Executive compensation of the listed companies in China has been increasing dramatically in recent years. As the decision maker and manager of company’s operation, the executives’ behavior has critical impacts on the company’s performance, as well as the company’s prospects and the shareholders' benefits. Therefore, resolving the agency problem between shareholders and managers is very important. Compensation mechanism is one of the main means to resolve the agency problem. Good compensation mechanism can encourage executives, and lower the agency costs, furthermore to improve shareholders' benefit. But many researchers have found that there are managerial entrenchments in determining executive compensation, and such managerial entrenchments will reduce compensation’s incentive effects. This essay analyzes the impact of corporate governance on the relevance between executive compensation and performance, examines the moderating effect of corporate governance on executives' compensation mechanism in China. The results are as follows: Firstly, executives’ compensation is significantly positively related with ROA. Secondly, ownership concentration, board size, shareholdings rate of the board have positive effect to the relevance between compensation and performance, and thus strengthen the compensation and performance relevance. Duality, independent director proportion have negative effect to the relevance between compensation and performance, and thus weaken the compensation and performance relevance. Thirdly, board size, shareholdings rate of the board is positively related to the compensation and performance relevance in private companies, it means corporate governance has positive effect on compensation mechanism, but in subsample of state-owned companies, we haven't found that positive effect. The results of this paper will contribute to perfect the executive compensation mechanism, and have important significance for lowering agency cost, and improving shareholders’ benefit.