최저한세 제도와 기업의 투자효율성간의 관련성에 대한 연구 - 우리나라 대기업을 중심으로 -

Lyon(1990) developed theoretical model of cost of capital for firms anticipating Alternative Minimum Tax(hearafter ‘AMT’) liability. He explains that cost of capital of firms under AMT can be high because AMT creates a level playing field by not permitting some firms to make excessive use of certain tax deduction and raises required cost of capital for investment alternatives. Biddle and Hilary(2006) suggest that managers(i. e. firms) endowed with capital invest until the marginal return is zero, allowing for adjustment costs such as agency cost, corporate governance structure and tax related costs. AMT in Korea stipulates that company must pay minimum tax and carry over tax credit and exemption(tax benefits from investment) which will be used in sequence over a certain period. This indicates that firms paying AMT can not fully enjoy the tax saving effects and thus their pre-tax minimum rate of return from investment alternatives may increases. Thus, AMT system may mislead managers’ investment decision because different tax effects on same investment opportunity will have impact on the degree of investment efficiency. Since introduction of AMT in 1991, policy direction for AMT in Korea has been changed according to the macroeconomic circumstance. For example, after 2009, regulatory authority reduced tax rate of AMT to promote investment activity focusing on quantitative perspectives maintaining tax fairness between large and small-medium firms. However, apart from regulation, managers’ investment decision usually includes timing of investment and the degree of economic productivity from efficient investment in order to maximize economic profit. Therefore, to increase impact of tax system, regulation authority needs to consider discriminatory impact of regulation on firms considering cross-sectional characteristics of their investment efficiency. To answer this empirical issue, the study examines the relation between AMT and investment efficiency using 3,133 firm-year samples focusing on large firms(listed in KSE and KOSDAQ). The study also investigates whether regulation change makes effect on cross-sectional variation of firms under AMT compared to regular tax liability. Key hypotheses to test these issues are as following: First, the study expects that firms under AMT will show significant difference from firms paying regular tax for investment inefficiency. Moreover, firms under AMT will have lower level of over-investment and will have more negative level of under-investment than those of firms paying regular tax. Second, When tax rate of AMT is reduced, firms having tendency of under-investment will react in the direction of elimination of under-investment. Followings are findings of the study. First, the study finds that firms paying AMT have negative relation with investment efficiency as expected. More specifically, results show that over-investment firms paying AMT have lower level of real investment than firms paying regular tax and under investment firms paying AMT also have lower level of real investment than firms paying the regular tax. These findings imply that AMT which limits tax benefits from investing activities makes firms be reluctant to their investment decision because of increase of adjustment costs related to return on their investment. Second, as expected, the study observes that after 2009(reduction in tax rate of AMT), under-investment firms paying AMT show positive relation with under-investment inefficiency, which indicates that the reduction of AMT has discriminatory effects on firms with under-investment propensity. The study points several new implications to existing literature. First, the study suggests that AMT tax system has a distinctive role in corporate investment propensity. In spite of the various tax credit or exemption, the study empirically shows that tax system designed to levy a minimum level of tax burden serves to control excessive investment. However, to accelerate efficient investment payout, results of the study show that AMT may be potential obstacle because of the absence of tax saving effect by AMT. Second, this study suggests implication that the degree of investment efficiency depends on the operating effectiveness of tax policy. That is, when incorporating tax cut, finding of the study suggest that regulatory authority needs to consider its discriminatory impact on firm-level characteristics related to investment propensity.