국민연금이 기업지배구조에 미치는 영향

A national pension fund in Korean domestic firms has increased, it has remained a high level, thus accounting for 6.8% of market by the end of 2014. Thus, the national pension ownership occupying an increasingly important position in the Korean capital market, influences corporate governance. Prior studies report that firms with better governance enjoy lower capital cost and get the improvement of profit. Therefore, a national pension ownership will influence corporate governance to maximize the investee company’ value in terms of the revenue growth of pension subscriber. However, now questions are being asked regarding the effect of a national pension ownership on corporate governance, and it is because a national pension ownership has controled from governance institutions, unlike institutional investors such as financial institutions. There is little reference on this perspective. So, I investigate whether the shareholder activism by a national pension ownership improves corporate governance. I expect that a national pension ownership impacts managers' management decision to reduce the agency problem and improve the firm value. For purpose of this study, I focus on the role of a national pension blockholder holding at least a 5% equity in individual firm. In particular, a national pension blockholder holding at least a 5% equity tends to play an important control role in managers' management decision with shareholder’ rights awarded with their holding. This study investigates the following as to whether: 1) a national pension blockholder affects corporate governance; 2) the effect of a national pension blockholder on the improvement of corporate governance increases in terms of the long investment; 3) the holding level of a national pension blockholder affects corporate governance. The sample for this study is obtained from firms listed on the Korea Exchange (KRX) from 2004 to 2010. I employ the total sample using 1,032 firm-year observations from the KIS-VALUE database and the matching sample for national pension blockholders. The data of national pension blockholders are collected from the TS-2000 database provided from the Korea Listed Companies Association(KLCA). Also, I employ other financial data from the KIS-VALUE database. My empirical findings are summarized as follows. First, I find that a national pension blockholder ownership is positively associated with corporate governance. Second, this study demonstrates that there is a stronger positive association between a national pension blockholder ownership and corporate governance, in terms of long investment. However, this study reports that the holding level of a national pension blockholder is not associated with corporate governance. The results suggest that the existence of a national pension blockholder, rather than the percentage of shareholding, is important to the impact factor of corporate governance. This study is, to the best of my knowledge, the first to confirm the relationship between a national pension blockholder ownership and corporate governance. These results may prove useful in the plan of institutional improvement for shareholder activism, and might have some effect on the improvement of the efficiency of capital market. Also, this study can contribute to the government policy for the improvement of corporate governance.