독일 연방의회 내 연합 정치와 교섭단체의 입법 효율성: 1990년 이후를 중심으로

In Germany the coalition politics does not pursue only the benefits of public office but are also strongly policy-oriented and in the Bundestag the principle of free mandate and the principle of parliamentary group are harmonized on the basis of the autonomy of parliamentary group. Accordingly, the parliamentary groups build coalitions actively as main player of legislation in the Bundestag. As a result of the analysis of legislation in Bundestag between 1990 and 2013, the frequency of bill submission was similar between individual parliamentary groups and the coalitions of parliamentary groups. However, the legislative efficiency is much higher in the case of the later than the former. In addition, with regard to the influence of the electoral coalition, it was meaningless in the case of opposing coalitions because the frequency of bill submission was very low. But it was partially significant in the case of pan-policy coalitions and relatively very significant in the case of the ruling coalitions. The experience of electoral coalition exerted an influence on the frequency of bill submission by pan-policy coalitions only in the 1990s and even not on the legislative efficiency. On the contrary, the succession of electoral coalition exerted a strong influence on the legislative efficiency of ruling coalitions, while hardly on the frequency of their bill submission. This analysis shows that the experience and succession of electoral coalition and the coalition politics of parliamentary group are important factors of the improvement of legislative efficiency and the development of parliamentary politics.