기업지배구조가 배당스무딩에 미치는 영향

This paper attempts to examine corporate governance affecting dividend smoothing. Although on average dividends tend to be sticky, intertemporal patterns in dividends vary considerably across firms, and systematic empirical evidence on the underlying determinants of dynamic dividend behavior is scarce. I offers evidence that variation in corporate governance and managerial incentive conflicts explains differences in intertemporal properties of dividends. Weak governance can result in misalignment of managers and shareholders and lead to inefficient investment. Stable dividends limit managerial discretion and free cash flow at the manager’s disposal. So I suggest that smooth dividends are an alternative to traditional corporate governance mechanisms. According to my main empirical findings, I document a greater degree of dividend smoothing at firms with weak corporate governance mechanisms. This paper sheds light on the differences between firms with weak versus strong governance mechanisms with respect to aggregate trends, such as dividend change. However, some issues are open for future research. While this paper has focused on dividend smoothing, it would be of interest to examine the joint determination of dividend and earning smoothing in settings with varying corporate governance quality.