지배주주의 소유지배구조와 실물투자의 관련성

This paper empirically investigates the relevance between ownership structure of controlling shareholders and real investment over the period 2001 through 2008. The typical Korea listed company in the large business group is holding more voting rights than cash flow rights. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether shareholding in the large business group is used as a means of governance or real investment. This study set investment model combined with Tobin’s Q model and sales－accelerator model to investigate the relationship between governance and investment. The results demonstrate that the controlling shareholders of large business group holds excess control rights and more invests to the affiliated companies. Second, I observe a positive and significant relationship between voting rights and real investment at the large business group with a chairman. This paper contributes to the relevance between ownership structure of controlling shareholders and real investment. Based on the results of this study, this result suggests that policy makers have to observe the relationship between the equity and real investments so as to extend the real investment.