Ex Post Liability, Ex Ante Safety Regulation, and Impending Product Recalls

This paper investigates how potential defects in automobiles lead to vehicle recalls. Using data on vehicle recalls in the United States in 2014, I identifies how vehicle manufacturers make their recall decisions and what factors they consider to issue recalls. Using both a unique data and an empirical model, this paper finds that manufacturers issue recalls when higher expected liability costs are anticipated. In particular, vehicle manufacturers use information on the damages that have occurred in previous accidents reported to either the regulatory agent or themselves. I also find that the regulatory agent’s investigative actions are positively associated with more recall issuance, which implies that their investigative activities send manufacturers a strong message to correct problems, given that recall issuance is basically voluntary. If there is a model change in a new-year model, then there are more recalls during the first year of sales. This shows that it is inevitable for manufacturers to issue more recalls because more defective parts are found in the process of adopting and introducing new features from facing competition in the automobile market. In conclusion, manufacturers, facing severe competition, issue more recalls to avoid expected liability costs from defects.