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This paper is grounded on earlier studies stating that external stakeholders' monitoring of levered firms lessens the agency problem formed between the management and the external stakeholders. This was proven by examining if the accounting quality of levered firms is more effective than the case of unlevered firms using abnormal accruals(discretionary accruals) and accrual quality as presented by Dechow and Dichev(2002). Summary of the results of the analysis is as follows; First, empirical result supported the hypothesis that accounting quality of levered firms is higher than unlevered firms’ accounting quality on three of accounting quality research model using LevDND classified by net liabilities. The regression coefficient for the three variables showed significant negative results at 99% confidence level. Secondly, long-term bank loans were used to classify the firm’s leverage which was the explanatory variable represented by LevDBL in the regression model. The result of the accounting quality measurement was not significant, or it was negative at 5% or 10% significance level. As expected, corporate structure, growth, and profitability as control variables showed significant results with accounting quality depending on the measurement. In addition, This study provides the evidence that other control variables, for example, cash reserve ratio(CASH), firm size(SIZE), debt ratio(DE), operation cycle(OPCYCLE) have significant effects on three methods of accounting quality(AQDD, AQTWW, AQMJ). This study is significant that it presents the effect of monitoring of creditors has to the capital market by comparing levered firms’ accrual quality and unlevered firms’ accrual quality.