헤겔 『법철학』에서의 Gewissen의 문제

This essay aims at not only disclosing how Hegel criticizes the duty ethics of Kant in the process of transition from the region of ‘morarity’(Moralität) to the region of ’ethical life’(Sittlichkeit) in Hegel's Philosophy of Right., but also explicating the difference between morality and ethical life through the presentation of the roll and the meaning that ‘Gewissen’(conscience) takes in the realm of morality. Furthermore, it is examined how the word Gewissen has to be translated into Korean. The ‘Gewissen’ in Hegel intends to follow the universal good or strives to fullfill merely subjective desires. On the former occasion Gewissen is called good, while on the latter occasion bad. Gewissen is therefore merely a moral conviction or moral consciousness about the good, not in itself good. When our subjective knowledge or volition corresponds to the in-and-for itself valid rational contents or the real good, it becomes true conscience (das wahrhafte Gewissen). Otherwise, conscience is nothing but a (subjective) moral consciousness or conviction (das formelle Gewissen). Hegel calls the former “real moral conviction”, the latter “formal moral conviction”. It is therefore claimed in this essay, that only to the former we have to use the terminology ‘Yang-Shim’[양심(良心)], but to the latter ‘moral consciousness’ or ‘moral conviction’.