과세관청의 세무조사가 경영자와 이해관계자 간의 정보비대칭을 감소시키는가?

This study has examined in what ways the information asymmetry between managers and parties interested is affected by the disclosure of the findings from a tax investigation of those companies whose disclosure was published by DART of the Financial Supervisory Service because the tax investigation by a tax office led to a tax penalty of 5% (in case of a big corporation, 2.5%) out of its equity capital. In addition, in order to secure the robustness of the analysis results, ASR of daily absolute returns, SR of daily relative returns and AR of daily excess returns were employed for the verification of the proxy to the information asymmetry between the two. The followings are the findings from the analysis of the companies that disclosed their tax penalties from tax investigations from 2004 to 2012 on DART of the Financial Supervisory Services. First, the year subject to a tax investigation was revealed to have a bigger information asymmetry between the two than the previous year. That is, when there is any tax penalty from a tax investigation of a corporate by a tax office, the concern for the corporate of the parties interested increases while the information asymmetry between the two gets bigger since the managers are bound to have the limitation to offering the information enough to satisfy those parties interested. Second, the following year of a tax investigation was found to have a lower information asymmetry between the two than the year when the tax investigation was conducted, the reason for which is thought that those parties interested stepped up the surveillance on the corporate after the investigation and also the managers aggressively disclosed the information on the corporate in capital markets so as to reduce no-tax costs. When these findings are considered, the information asymmetry is thought to decrease after a tax investigation by a tax office. This is because the parties interested strengthen their surveillance of the company by the disclosure of the data on tax investigation and tax penalty and the manager also try to provide more information to the parties interested in the capital markets in order to minimize the increase of non-tax costs. Accordingly, the information on tax investigation by tax offices are regarded to reduce the information asymmetry of capital markets and to be useful information to any parties interested.