은행의 소유·지배구조와 위험

This study analyzes the effects of banks’ ownership-governance structures on their risks. First of all, using the data of Korean commercial banks from 2000 to 2011, the empirical result indicates that the risk appetite of a bank is a reversed U-shaped function of the insiders ownership (or the largest shareholder ownership). This means that, as the insiders ownership (the largest shareholder ownership) increases, a bank’s risk initially increases and, thereafter, decreases. This result can be explained by the agency theory of outside equity. That is, as the insiders ownership (the largest shareholder ownership) increases, the managers’ incentives become more closely aligned with those of the entire shareholders and they increase the bank’s risk to improve the shareholders value. However, when the insiders ownership (the largest shareholder ownership) exceeds a certain level, the managers can have their positions more secured and become more interested in their private interests instead of the shareholders value. This induces the managers to reduce the bank’s risk. Second, the risk appetite of a bank is not influenced by the characteristics of the insiders. The empirical results shows that whether a bank is foreign-owned or government-owned does not affect the bank’s risk. These results provide an implication regarding the Korean bank industry. Recently, there is increasing concerns about the Korean banks’ governance structures, which provoke more shareholder-oriented structure. As the banks’ managers emphasize shareholders value more heavily, the banks may take higher risks. Inevitably, this will require more refined risk management.