탈인간중심적 법학의 가능성 - 과학기술의 도전에 대한 행정법학의 대응 -

Science technology that has developed greatly in a modern society has become a serious challenge to the law. This can be said in two respects. First, new regulatory regions that did not exist in the past emerge as scientific technology advances. Second, scientific technology gives us new ways of thinking that the existing law and legal system did not recognize. These new ways of thinking conflict with the exiting legal system, leading to restrictions and conflicts. However, on the other hand, they are accommodated by the existing legal system, contributing to the evolution of the legal system. This article addresses post-anthropocentric thought which is one of the new ways of thinking. These post-anthropocentric thought pursues the ways of thinking that are different from ‘anthropocentric thought’ on which our legal system is still based. Anthropocentric legal thought designs the legal system based on humans. This article argues that this anthropocentric legal thought is composed of ＜subject-object model＞, actions-centered thought and anthropocentric life concept. On the contrary, post-anthropocentric thought regards the system, not the human subject, as the center of the legal system, by expanding the human subject. Furthermore, it criticizes that free will is just an illusion, deconstructing anthropocentric life concept. What significances does the post-anthropocentric thought have for administrative law? This article is intended to address how post-anthropocentric thought can be accepted by the administrative law. However, according to this article, our administrative law has already accepted a large portion of the post-anthropocentric thought. This article demonstrates that the administrative law accommodates itself to the systems and communications concept. The judicial person concept represented by a state, administrative plans and authoritative factual actions illustrate this well. Of course, there are still inadequate parts, so this article makes a reference to the collective right as an example. In addition, this article argues that the administrative law needs to accept the thesis of ‘functional differentiation’ emphasized by the systems theory.