기업지배구조, 투자기회 및 조세회피

The governance disparity is a common form of ownership around the world. Numerous studies report that controlling blockholders have power over their firms significantly in excess of his cash flow rights. It has been known that Investment opportunities set(IOS) is very related with various accounting policies including choice of accounting procedure which are in turn largely involved with contracting costs. Prior research suggests that differences between book and taxable incomes reflect firms’ underlying economic fundamentals and their opportunistic earnings management activities. In this study, I examine more high the earnings management of high governance disparity and investment opportunities set relative to their counterparts. A firm with high governance disparity and investment opportunities set is likely to face different types of agency problems from a firm with low governance disparity and investment opportunities set. The governance disparity of firms face severe agency problem due to the separation of ownership and management and IOS severe agency problems that arise between controlling and noncontrolling shareholders. Using a book－tax difference(BTD) measure to capture earnings management and to find an appropriate IOS proxy variable, this study works with four IOS candidate variables used in Baber et al.(1996). The sample consists of manufacturing firms listed on Korean Stock Exchange for 8 years from 2001 to 2008. I do not find that a firm with high governance disparity is more high the difference between book income and tax income than their counterparts in Korea. The positive relation between BTD and IOS exhibits more evidently when we measure BTDs based on Factor analysis to be conducted for the sets which include more than two IOS　candidate variables. This result suggests that the owner with the high IOS are willing to forgo tax benefits in order to gain agency benefit.