환경기술 특허권 양도전략과 재실시권의 후생효과

This study analyzes the eco-patent transfer strategy of the patentee when polluting duopoly firms have different production costs and emit pollutions in the production process. With allowing sublicensing strategy of licensee, we compare market equilibrium and social welfare of eco-patent transfer. The followings are the main findings. First, patentee transfers the eco-patent to an inefficient firm when production cost gap is small, while to an inefficient firm when cost gap is large. Second, after obtaining of the eco-patent, inefficient firm operates sublicense to the efficient firm, while efficient firm uses it exclusively without sublicensing. Third, sublicensing strategy of inefficient firm improves social welfare but the welfare effect of the monopolistic use of patent by efficient firm depends on the cost gap. When cost gap is large, exclusive right of patent using is socially desirable, but when it is small, sublicensing is socially more desirable. Thus, the appropriate policy on the sublicensing in the eco-patent trading market is required.