관료, 경제 및 세무관료출신 사외이사의 선임여부에 따른 기업의 조세회피성향의 차이 - 유가증권시장을 중심으로

It is analyzed in this study whether corporate tax avoidance tendencies are different when companies appoint ex-bureaucrats and economic / tax ex-bureaucrats as outside directors in the board of directors. Outside director system was introduced in S. Korea to secure management transparency and improve corporate governance structure because it makes independent outside directors with expertise participate in the board of directors and its decision making. Because most outside directors are nominated and elected by major shareholders, management, and board of directors, however, the independence of outside directors from management has been doubted. Despite the doubt, appointment rate of ex-bureaucrats as outside directors was relatively high from the beginning and has continuously increased. Ex-bureaucrat outside directors have merits that they have expertise relating to their official duties accumulated and human networks with government agencies and companies built while they were in the government. Therefore, it is probable for companies to appoint as outside directors ex- bureaucrats regardless of their government agencies to obtain indirect supports, or economic and tax ex-bureaucrats to obtain substantial supports for tax avoidance when they appoint outside directors. This study analyzes whether corporate tax avoidance tendencies are different according to appointment of ex-bureaucrats and economic / tax ex-bureaucrats as outside directors by using the companies which had been listed on the securities market from 2000 to 2010. The analysis result reveals that out of total outside directors, 24.9% were ex-bureaucrats next to 42.7% who were ex-entrepreneurs. Out of ex-bureaucrat outside directors, 34.4% were economic ex-bureaucrats out of them 69.3% were tax ex-bureaucrats. This means that companies have preference for ex-bureaucrats and have even more preference for economic / tax ex-bureaucrats as their outside directors. Tax avoidance tendencies of the companies with ex-bureaucrat outside directors are significantly high in average and median than the companies without ex-bureaucrat outside directors. But when characteristics of the companies and the board of the directors, which have been reported to influence tax avoidance tendencies, are controlled, no significant differences are observed. Tax avoidance tendencies of the companies with economic / tax ex-bureaucrat outside directors are significantly high in average and median than the companies without economic / tax ex-bureaucrat outside directors. And the results are revealed consistent even when the characteristics of the companies and the board of the directors, which have been reported to influence Tax avoidance tendencies, are controlled. Also, when only the companies that have appointed ex-bureaucrat outside directors are analyzed, the companies that have appointed economic / tax ex-bureaucrat outside directors have significantly higher tax avoidance tendencies than the companies that have appointed the other ex-bureaucrat outside directors, The study shows that tax avoidance tendencies are not different whether or not the companies have appointed ex-bureaucrat outside directors. But when the companies have appointed economic / tax ex-bureaucrat outside directors, they have relatively high tax avoidance tendencies. This results have contributing points as follows: First, the result reveals that tax avoidance tendencies are different only when the companies have appointed economic / tax ex-bureaucrat outside directors. This result can be utilized by tax regulatory agency in directing and supervising the companies efficiently by considering whether they have appointed economic / tax ex-bureaucrat outside directors. In addition, if tax regulatory agency considers former government offices of ex-bureaucrat outside directors, it will reduce the incentives of the companies to appoint economic / tax ex-bureaucrat outside directors and achieve the purpose of outside directors system. The result that the companies with economic /tax ex-bureaucrat outside directors have relatively higher tax avoidance tendencies than the companies with or without other ex-bureaucrat outside directors suggest that the companies appoint outside directors with the purpose of tax avoidance. Also, by providing the empirical evidence that the economic and tax ex-bureaucrat outside directors help the companies avoid taxes, this study will be helpful in decision making such as setting employment restriction period to prevent violation of Public Service Ethics Act and bureaucrats from being granted unfair privileges for their public offices. Finally, by providing fractional but empirical evidence of the reason why companies appoint outside directors, this study will make regulatory agency consider the companies’ purposes of appointing outside directors when it make decisions on polices relating to outside director system.