소비자안전사고에 관한 배상책임원칙의 경제적 효율성 연구

This paper attempts to analyze theoretically the issue of consumer safety policy with respect to social welfare and efficiency. This study provides a model within the framework of game theory, in which the liability principle is combined with market mechanism. In particular, the model explicitly includes the uncertainty of information about hazard. The comparison between the attention level and information of product risk level of both producer and consumer shows that there exists a significant difference in efficiency depending on each liability rule. Under the no-liability rule, market competition leads the producers to pay attention to the risk, when the customers have perfect information. However, when the customers have imperfect information, the producers pay no attention to the risk. Under the negligence rule, the producers will be careful, but the consumers will not be careful. Under the strict liability rule, consumers have no need to pay attention, whether or not they have the full information. Finally, under the strict liability with the defense of contributory negligence rule, the legal attention level is efficiently estimated and the consumers' over estimation of the loss results in efficiency regardless of the degree of the information perfectness. The basic measures of consumer safety policy are suggested in the last part with the consideration of the some realistic aspects.