감사인의 보수적 평가와 경영자의 경제적 유인이 감사인 교체와 감사보수에 미치는 영향

Prior research provides inconsistent results on the relationship between auditors’ conservative assessment and either auditor changes or audit fees. This study considers auditors’ conservative assessment as an interaction between audit report lag and high earnings management. The purpose of this study is to verify whether the cause of auditor changes and increased audit fees is the conflicts of auditors’ conservative assessment and managers’ economic incentives by examining the effects of auditors’ conservative assessment on auditor changes and increased audit fees, with these effects more strengthened by managers incentives to pursue their own interests. These results of this study are as follows: First, it appears that audit report lag(AULAG), high earnings management(HIGH_EM), and high executive compensation(HIGH_COMP, HIGH_COMPIND) have individually no effect on audit fees. However, the interaction between these three variables is positively associated with auditor changes. Therefore, auditors are changed not by only auditors’ conservative assessment but by the conflicts of it and managers’ economic incentives. Second, it appears that audit fees are positively associated with high earnings management and high executive compensation. The interaction between audit report lags and high earnings management are also positively associated with audit fees. Moreover, the interaction between these three variables is positively associated with audit fees for firms with continuous auditors. Consequently, managers put more efforts into selecting auditors lenient to them when auditors’ conservative assessment conflicts with their economic incentives and despite managers’ pressure, the continuous auditor assesses highly managers incentives to pursue their own interests and prior auditors’ conservative assessment in audit risk.