세후이익에 기초한 경영자 보상이 감사인의 세무서비스 구매의사결정에 미치는 영향

In this paper, I examine whether the use of after－tax accounting earnings in chief executive officer(CEO) compensation leads to greater purchase of auditor－provided tax services. These results show whether CEO recognizes an auditor as an assistor or not a monitor. I examine further whether purchase of auditor－provided tax services helps to greater tax avoidances. These results show whether or not an auditor follows the CEO's opinion. First, The association between a use of after－tax accounting earnings in CEO compensation and a purchase of auditor－provided tax services is negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Second, I examine if a company rely on an auditor, whether or not the association lessened. I find that the more the company rely on their auditor, the more the association lessened and the results is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Third, the association between a purchase of auditor－provided tax services and a tax burden is not statistically significant. The association is changed in case of the use of after－tax accounting earnings in chief executive officer(CEO) compensation. These results show that an auditor don't follow the CEO's opinion and feels that there is a greater tax risk. This paper contributes to find the association the use of after－tax accounting earnings in CEO compensation and auditor－provided tax services.