재무분석가의 이익예측치와 경영자 교체 간의 관련성에 대한 조절요인들

Much research on CEO turnover has focused on only business performance and corporate governance as a cause of CEO turnover. It has neglected what is happening to management when they do not attain analyst earnings forecasts while claiming that CEO has profit objectives to achieve. The purpose of this study is to verify that analyst earnings forecasts can be the cause of CEO turnover by examining whether the relationship between analyst earnings forecasts and CEO turnover is moderated by CEOs’ poor performance and lack of ability to avoid dismissal risk. The findings of this study do not show the direct effect of analyst forecast errors and accuracy on CEO turnover. However, this relationship appears to be significantly positive when managers perform poorly. This result suggests that high forecast errors and its lower accuracy can be the crucial cause of CEO turnover when managers perform poorly. On the other hand, the insignificant relationship between analyst forecasts and CEO turnover does not depend on the shares owned by managers. This result indicates that, considering Korean environment of family－owned firms, not all managers with low ownership are more vulnerable to dismissal pressure caused by earnings far lower than earnings forecasts. This study contributes to prior research by providing new evidence that a shortfall of earnings forecasts is the cause of CEO turnover and it provides stakeholders with opportunities to seek a new light and an application plan for earnings forecasts.