스타트업 창업회사의 선주문 방식을 통한 자금조달의 문제점에 관한 법적 연구
Pre-order or Ponzi Scheme? : How to Regulate Quasi-Startups' Pre-order Sales of Image
김희철(원광대학교)
14권 1호, 197~218쪽
초록
소규모 창업회사들은 이제 벤처캐피털뿐만 아니라 지분형 크라우드펀딩을 통하여도 회사자금조달이 가능하다. 회사의 성공가능성에 기반들 두고 투자결정을 하는 벤처캐피털과는 달리 크라우드펀딩은 개발예정인 상품에 대한 소비자계층의 선호도가 매우 중요하다. 이러한 선호도는 결국 소비자들의 구매욕구와도 이어진다. 그러므로 지분형 크라우드펀딩을 통한 자금조달을 도모하는 회사들이 자연스럽게 선주문 방식을 통한 자금조달을 병행하게 된다. 심지어 지분형 크라우드펀딩을 통한 자금조달을 시도조차 하지 않으면서 선주문만을 수령하는 회사들도 생겨나고 있다. 심지어 차일피일 제품의 출시예정일을 미루면서도 계속적으로 선주문을 수령하고 있다. 이러한 경우 후순위 주문자가 납입한 제품대금으로 선순위 주문자의 환불요청에 응하고 있는 것인바, 이는 자본시장법에서 금지하고 있는 폰지사기와 매우 유사한 형태가 된다는 문제점이 있다. 본고에서는 먼저 이러한 문제가 전자상거래소비자보호법, 민법, 자본시장법 등을 통한 해결이 가능한가를 살펴보았다. 전자상거래소비자보호법에서는 선주문에 대하여 당사자간의 정함으로 해결하도록 하는 등 선주문에 대한 충분한 법적 기반을 제시하고 있다고 보기 어렵고, 민법 및 자본시장법에서도 선주문을 폰지사기처럼 운영하는 경우에 소비자를 보호할 수 있는 법적 기반이 마련되어 있다고 보기 어렵다. 특히 자본시장법은 특별히 폰지사기 규정을 두고 있으나 선주문이 자본시장법상 증권에 해당하지 아니하여 적용대상이 될 수 없다. 대부분의 선주문 계약이 약관에 의하여 이루어지기 때문에 본고에서는 약관규제법에 의한 법적 기반을 통한 소비자보호방안을 제시하고 있다. 이러한 방안의 실효성을 확보하기 위하여 공정거래위원회의 감독도 필요할 것이다.
Abstract
Startup companies can attract capital through equity crowdfunding as well as from venture capital. Venture capital usually asks startups for proving the probability of success of their business model. On the other hand, crowdfunding makes it easier for startups to raise capital than traditional one. Lodging product design plan to crowdfunding platform may substitute for the proving of the probability of business success. The creative product design may attract both of the investors and consumers. To raise capital, therefore, company may use pre-order as well as equity crowdfunding. There is no regulation or restriction on pre-order. It may be easier for companies' to attract capital through pre-order than equity crowd- funding. Therefore, pre-order will be used no less than equity crowdfunding in the near future. The problem is that some startups keep postponing product launching and keep pretending to make product. Nevertheless, they also keep soliciting pre-order offers from consumers. The quasi-straups respond consumers' refund request from new money paid by new pre-orderers. Those companies misuse pre-order as a way to run quasi-ponzi scheme, needless to say that they do not differ much from borrowing consumers' money without paying interests at all. In spite of such an abusing of pre-order, current laws are not able to fully cover such an quasi-ponzi scheme. "Korean Crowdfunding Act" does not provide any legal protections for pre-order consumers at all. The law only designed to provide investor protection. Korean "Act on the Consumer Protection in Electronic Commerce, ETC" §15(1) allows consumer and seller of pre-order can freely decide a specific delivery date and conditions without any intervene of the Act. "Korean Contract Law" also is not able to cover this problem. Web images inducing pre-order will not constitute an offer for sale of contract law, but it is a soliciting an offer from consumers. Unlike most of consumers' recognition, credit card clearance letter or any money transfer confirmation massage on the web is not regarded as an acceptance of the offer. Without startups' obvious expression of allowance, the legal basis of consumers' refund claim is not clear: whether it is 'cancellation of contract' or 'claim for return of unjust enrichment.' The latter will impose on startups the liability to pay interests. Contract to deliver a product that has not yet been manufactured before is not well recognized in current contract law as well. Korean Securities Act("Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act") is not applicable pre-order case because pre-order is not an 'investment contract' of Howey case. Many startups using standardized terms, so the author suggests that some provisions of "Korean Act on the Regulation of Terms and Conditions" should be revised so that the law can prohibit startups' from receiving consumers' offers even after the company fail to invent product at projected date as well as company should start to pay interest for pre-orderers from the expected release date. The author also suggest how to Korean FTC and Korean SEC deal with startups' off shore solicit offers. The author emphasizes on quasi-startups' pre-order regulations are crucial for the success of overall crowdfundings system. When consumers start to think that most of startups' innovatory products are too good to be true or when many consumers start to realize that crowdfunding platforms are full of pre-order stores instead of soliciting equity investment, regulatory bodies should see to it that they may not miss regulatory golden time.
- 발행기관:
- 한국금융법학회
- 분류:
- 법학