수직결합의 봉쇄효과 평가를 위한 경제분석 방법론

Recently, competition authorities in the United States and Europe have actively adopted economic analyses to evaluate the foreclosure effect of vertical mergers, and accordingly demand for economic methodologies to assess the economic impact of vertical mergers is greatly increasing. This paper introduces quantitative techniques for assessing the foreclosure effect of vertical mergers and tries to provide a conceptual framework which can be applied to real-world antitrust cases. Beginning with Vertical Arithmetic to assess a merged firm’s incentive to refuse to provide rivals with inputs or sales outlets, we introduce the vGUPPI methodology quantifying the price-increasing incentive of the merged firm toward rival firms. Also we discuss a quantitative technique measuring the price-raising incentive of a vertically integrated firm based on bargaining models, which has been adopted by the US Federal Communications Commission in the NBCU-Comcast case. Finally, we compare the strengths and weaknesses of the above three analytical techniques, and propose improvements for future events. I hope this paper to serve as a simple guidebook for researchers, practitioners and lawyers involved in antitrust law and competition policy.