자발적 공시의 질과 기업지배구조 간 관련성 연구 －이사회의 독립성과 감사위원회 설치 유무를 중심으로－

This study examines the relationship between voluntary disclosure quality and corporate governance, especially focused on the independence of board and introduction of the audit committee. According to the prior literature, a firm on high qualitative disclosure does a low discretionary accruals or prudent accounting throughout efficient monitoring manager and enlarges a firm’s transparency. As the efficiency of board ruled by outside directors restricts earnings management or increases the prudences of accounting, so makes good influences. Because the disclosure of reliable information enlarges a firm’s transparency, it is so much important to verify the relationship between voluntary disclosure quality and corporate governance. Nevertheless, few domestic study has examined the relationship between voluntary disclosure quality and corporate governance. For this reason, this study regress the relationship between voluntary disclosure quality and corporate governance, especially focused on the independence of board and introduction of the audit committee. We find evidence that as firms whose managers make voluntary disclosures of high quality as compared to a composition proportion of board by outside directors. As additional analysis, I regress the relationship between voluntary disclosure quality and composition of audit committee. I find evidence that there has been a significant relationship between voluntary disclosure quality and introduction of the audit committee. This study provides evidence that board ruled by outside directors and a introduction of the audit committee are a method to enhance the quality and credibility of voluntary disclosure. This paper contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature by studying a new voluntary disclosure measure created by Zhang(2005). We also found that outside directors and introduction of the audit committee play significantly positive roles in enhancing the quality of disclosures in order to decrease the information asymmetry between managers and investors. For this reason, this study may have implications that policy makers can achieve improvements in the quality of financial disclosure by encouraging voluntary disclosures to implement sound governance practices.