자율성 역량 모델의 법철학적 함의

Today, with the expansion of individualistic liberalism, the discourse of autonomy and rights to self-determination tends to be understood as the narrow privacy rights, which is largely centered on individual autonomy. In other words, the respect for autonomy or self-determination is understood as ensuring an independent self-determination by the subject with sufficient decision-making ability. That is, under any circumstances, the subject has an independent authority to decide on his own business without being disturbed. However, such a tendency to understand rights to self-determination as narrow privacy rights does not have a practical alternative to how it can be realized other than to declare that everyone has the right to self-determination, by returning the nature of self-determination to the passive right of the individual. Therefore, the recognition of the concept of autonomy, which is concentrated on the self-determination ability, should be newly transformed, and the justification of autonomy should be shifted from the procedural level to the substantive level. This article proposes the autonomy capability model in order to overcome the narrowness of autonomy and self-determination and discuss the applicability of this model. Based on these research goals, this paper has the following structure. First, the autonomy capability model is based on conceptual and methodological basis of Martha Nussbaum's capability approach, so this approach is introduced within the necessary range. Then, after explaining the basic concepts and core issues of the autonomy capability model, the significance of this model is examined in terms of substantive justification of rights to self-determination. In addition, the adult guardianship system can be justified from the standpoint of autonomy capability model, and the legal philosophical search for active management of the adult guardianship system is attempted. Finally, the legal philosophical implications of this model are mentioned.