초과감사보수에 대한 시장 참여자들의 인식: 추가적인 노력 투하 여부에 따른 차별적 해석

This paper analyzes folowing empirical isues. First, the study examines whether capital market participants properly interpret impairment of audit quality induced from excessive audit fees in their evaluation of acounting information. Second, the study suggests implication whether capital market participants discriminate property of excessive audit fees derived from ➀ economic bonding(without excessive audit efforts) ➁ hidden audit risk or cost (with excessive audit efforts) in their evaluation of accounting information. Followings are results of the study. First, we find that capital market participants negatively react to earnings surprise(UE) for firms paid excessive audit fees. Second, we also find that they properly discriminate property of excessive audit fees and negative evaluation of accounting information is more pronounced for firms without additional audit efforts. Our study contribute to literature about relation betwen audit quality and market evaluation by suggesting implication that in general, capital market participants are able to interpret accounting information impaired audit quality from economic bonding. Also, findings of the study are expected to be reference about market evaluation researches on impairment of audit quality from auditor-firm economic relation.